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From Safe Harbor to Choppy Waters:
YouTube, the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act,
and a Much Needed Change of Course
ABSTRACT
YouTube.com, named Time magazine's "Invention of the Year"
for 2006 and widely recognized as the most-visited video site on the
Internet, has changed the face of online entertainment. With the site's
acquisition by Google in October 2006, the possibilities for YouTube's
growth became truly endless. However, there is a darker side to the
story of the Internet sensation, one that is grounded in its potential
liability for copyright infringement. The issue is that many of the
most-viewed and most-popular videos on the site are copyrighted. The
copyright owners of those popular clips want their works back and are
suing YouTube and Google for infringing their copyrights.
In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA), specifically addressing the potential copyright liability of
Internet service providers. The DMCA provides a series of "safe
harbors" for certain activities of Internet service providers, ensuring
limited liability so long as providers comply with the "notice and take-
down"provision of the statute. To date, YouTube has been capitalizing
on the safe harbors provided by the DMCA and has avoided liability
for infringement. Although the DMCA protects Internet service
providers like YouTube, it leaves copyright holders out in the cold.
This Note first traces the development of copyright law and the
liability of Internet service providers from the Copyright Act of 1976 to
the DMCA. The Author then evaluates potential copyright claims
against YouTube and Google under both statutes, with special
emphasis on the applicability of the safe harbor provisions of the
DMCA. The Author then discusses the current legal status of YouTube,
how the site has avoided copyright liability in the past, and how it
fares under the more traditional fair use analysis. The Author
concludes that YouTube should not be eligible for a fair use defense
and argues that the site, with all of its far-reaching capabilities, should
be held responsible for its infringing actions.
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"Broadcast YourselfrM": 1 two simple words and one website
have revolutionized the world of Internet entertainment. The year
2006 was quite a year for YouTube.com (YouTube) and its founders
Chad Hurley and Steven Chen.2  Lauded as Time magazine's
"Invention of the Year" for 20063 and the "most-visited video site on
1. YouTube.com, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).
2. Kevin J. Delaney, Garage Brand: With NBC Pact, YouTube Site Tries to Build a
Lasting Business, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2006, at Al.
3. Lev Grossman, The People's Network, TIME, Nov. 13, 2006, at 62.
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the web," 4 YouTube was founded in February 2005 above a pizzeria in
San Mateo, California.5 The concept was born of necessity, as Hurley
and Chen recognized the need for an efficient way to share personal
videos with friends.6 They developed the site as a "consumer media
company" in order to allow people across the globe to upload and share
videos.7 However, it has evolved into much more than a simple
conduit through which to pass information. As the site itself
acknowledges, YouTube has "grown into an entertainment destination
with people watching more than 70 million videos . ..daily." No
longer the pet-project of two friends, YouTube has become a universal
sensation, as demonstrated by its acquisition by the Internet
behemoth Google in October 2006 for a staggering $1.65 billion.9
With popularity came problems, however. As early as
December 2005, the same month in which the site was publicly
unveiled, YouTube faced allegations of copyright infringement. 10 A
popular skit from NBC's "Saturday Night Live" was uploaded onto the
site without the network's permission and quickly became a user
favorite." While YouTube eventually removed the offending clip after
notice was provided by NBC, the skit had already been viewed six
million times. 12 The "Saturday Night Live" incident was merely a
harbinger of things to come for the popular site, especially once Google
came on to the scene. News agencies across the world noted the
staggering deal as well as the problems that came along with it:
"Google Will Inherit Law Claims Over YouTube";' 3 "At YouTube, A
Copyright Conundrum Continues."'
14
The fact that YouTube users unlawfully post copyrighted
material is not at issue: "the most-viewed items often involve some
4. Delaney, supra note 2, at Al.
5. Id.
6. See id.
7. About YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/t/about (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
8. Id.
9. Grossman, supra note 3, at 62.
10. See Delaney, supra note 2, at Al (noting that the site's creators recognized
potential infringement claims and contacted NBC on December 28, 2005 to find out
"whether NBC had provided [one particular] clip itself, and volunteered to remove [the clip]
from YouTube if the video had been shared without NBC's permission").
11. See id. ("[S]omeone posted to YouTube a skit from NBC's 'Saturday Night Live'
dubbed 'Lazy Sunday,' featuring two grown men rapping about cupcakes, red licorice candy
and 'The Chronicles of Narnia' film.").
12. Id.
13. Kenneth Li & Yinka Adegoke, Google Will Inherit Law Claims Over YouTube,
BIRMINGHAM POST, Oct. 12, 2006, at B23.
14. Barrie McKenna, At YouTube, A Copyright Conundrum Continues, GLOBE &
MAIL, Oct. 11, 2006, at B1.
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type of copyright infringement."15 The popular site has conceded this
much in its recent deals at home and abroad. In an attempt to quell
the raging storm of copyright liability, YouTube removed almost
30,000 clips of television shows, movies, and music videos in early
October 2006, following a claim filed by the Japanese Society for
Rights of Authors, Composers and Publishers. 16 The site also has
begun entering licensing agreements with entertainment
powerhouses, including Universal Music Group, Sony BMG, and
Warner Music Group, to avoid potential infringement claims lodged by
those studios. 17 However, it is yet to be seen if such prophylactic
measures will assist Google in navigating the "litigation-laden
landmine" it secured with its most recent acquisition.' 8 But the
question remains: Has YouTube broadcasted itself right out of
business?
This Note addresses whether YouTube is liable for the
copyright infringement of its users. Part I traces the development of
copyright law and the liability of Internet service providers from the
Copyright Act of 1976 to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998. Part II analyzes YouTube's potential liability under both
statutes and considers possible fair use defenses available to the site.
Part III addresses the current state of YouTube and how the site has
avoided liability to this point. Finally, Part IV will address the
shortcomings of copyright law in attempting to regulate burgeoning
Internet technologies and a possible solution.
I. THE FOUNDATION OF COPYRIGHT
YouTube faces potential secondary liability for the infringing
activities of its users. In uploading copyrighted film clips, music
videos, and television shows, YouTube users are unlawfully violating
copyright holders' exclusive rights to reproduction and distribution as
set forth in § 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act).1 9 In
passing the Copyright Act, Congress sought to balance the competing
interests of promoting artistic creativity through protection and
reward, with the desire to expand and advance the bounds of public
15. Delaney, supra note 2, at Ai.
16. Noam Cohen, YouTube is Purging Copyrighted Clips, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006,
at C8.
17. See Li & Adegoke, supra note 13, at B23.
18. Tim Wu, Does YouTube Really Have Legal Problems? How the Bell Lobby
Helped Midwife YouThbe, SLATE, Oct. 26, 2006, http://slate.com/id/2152264.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
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knowledge. 20 In order to promote the former, § 106 of the Act grants
copyright holders a collection of exclusive rights in copyrighted works,
including the right of reproduction, the right of distribution, and the
right of public display.21 However, the Copyright Act also provides a
defense to some acts of copying under § 107-Limitations on Exclusive
Rights: Fair Use-in order to permit courts to "avoid [the] rigid
application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle
the very creativity which that law is designed to foster."
22
Case law has clarified and interpreted this section, creating
what is commonly referred to as the "fair use doctrine," a defense to
infringement liability. However, the fair use doctrine does not set
forth a concrete definition of fair use. Instead, it proposes several
factors to consider when evaluating a claim of fair use. The factors
include: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work; and (4) the potential market
harm resulting from copying the copyrighted work.
23
A. Expanding Upon Fair Use
The Supreme Court directly addressed the fair use doctrine in
the seminal case of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc.24 The case involved Sony's development of the Betamax video
tape recorder and possible copyright infringement by consumers.
25
The copyright owners of some publicly broadcast television programs
alleged that Sony's Betamax was used by its customers to record
copyrighted television programs, and sought to hold Sony liable for the
infringement. 26 In addition to the "substantial noninfringing uses" of
the Betamax, 27 the Court noted that "[e]ven unauthorized uses of a
copyrighted work are not necessarily infringing" and examined the
doctrine of "fair use" with respect to the Betamax.28 In evaluating the
first factor-the purpose and character of the use-the Court
determined that the copying by the Betamax was done for private,
20. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51-52 (1976).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
22. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d
Cir. 1980); see 17 U.S.C. § 107.
23. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
24. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
25. See id. at 420.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 456.
28. Id. at 447.
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time-shifting use, not a commercial venture.29 This tipped the scales
in favor of fair use. 30 Moreover, the programs were broadcast free of
charge. 31 Although the nature of the copyrighted work was creative,
and thus, at the core of copyright protection, this element was
discounted by the fact that audiences were invited to view the
programs for free.32 The same mitigating effect went toward the third
prong-the amount and substantiality of the portion copied. Although
the shows could be copied in their entirety, the fact that viewers were
invited to view them free of charge once again went in favor of fair
use.
33
The Court addressed the fourth factor-the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work-very carefully. According to the
Court, even noncommercial uses of a copyrighted work could have the
potential to infringe on a copyright owner's capacity to recoup on his
creative efforts. 34 However, "a challenge to a noncommercial use of a
copyrighted work requires proof that the particular use is harmful, or
that if it should become widespread, it would adversely affect the
potential market for the copyrighted work."35 Because the copyright
owners failed to prove such an actual or potential harm, the Court
held that Betamax users' time-shifting was fair use.
3 6
Legally, there can be no secondary liability without direct
liability. 37 If time-shifting had failed the fair use analysis, Betamax
users would have been directly liable for copyright infringement, and
Sony could have been exposed to secondary liability as a result. The
Sony Court acknowledged as much with its discussion of
"contributory" infringement. 38  However, because the Betamax was
capable of "substantial noninfringing uses," the Court refused to find
Sony liable for secondary copyright infringement.
29. See id. at 449. The Supreme Court explained that "time-shifting" occurred when
an "average member of the public uses a VTR principally to record a program he cannot
view as it is being televised and then to watch it once at a later time." Id. at 421.
30. See id. at 450.
31. Id. at 425.
32. See id. at 449-50.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 450.
35. Id. at 451.
36. See id. at 456.
37. 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 6.1 (2002).
38. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 435-38.
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B. The Development of Secondary Liability
One of the earliest cases addressing secondary liability was
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co.39 In Shapiro, defendant
H. L. Green (Green) owned a chain of retail stores and employed a
concessionaire, Jalen Amusement Co. (Jalen), to operate the record
departments in each of its stores. 40 Jalen produced "bootleg" records
to be sold in the defendant's stores. 41 Although Green denied any
contribution to the bootlegging activities of the direct infringer, the
Second Circuit found it liable nonetheless.
42
The court made the analogous distinction between a dance hall
proprietor and a landlord. 43 A landlord requires a fixed fee, has no
knowledge of the infringing activity that may take place upon his
premises, and exercises no supervision over that property. 44 A music
hall proprietor, on the other hand, has a direct financial interest in the
performers he may hire.45 If an infringing act is hired, it may bring in
additional customers and profits, thus making the dance hall
proprietor party to the infringing activity. 46 Because the defendant in
Shapiro had supervisory control over its concessionaire and a direct
financial interest in its sales, Green was likened to a dance hall
proprietor and liable for secondary copyright infringement. 4
7
The Shapiro court, in concluding that Green could be liable for
secondary infringement, noted:
[The dance-hall cases] and this one lie closer on the spectrum to the employer-
employee model than to the landlord-tenant model .... Green's relationship to its
infringing licensee, as well as its strong concern for the financial success of the
phonograph record concession, renders it liable for the unauthorized sales of the
"bootleg" records .... [T]he imposition of vicarious liability in the case before us
cannot be deemed unduly harsh or unfair. Green has the power to police carefully
the conduct of its concessionaire .... 48
Because the agreement between Green and Jalen was a licensing
agreement, Green directly benefited from the infringement by
39. 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
40. Id. at 306.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 307.
43. See id. at 307-08.
44. Id. at 307.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 308.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
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receiving ten to twelve percent of the revenue made from infringing
sales.
49
1. Liability of Internet Service Providers
The liability of Internet service providers (ISPs) became
increasingly prevalent in the early 1990s, as the World Wide Web was
escalating in popularity. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, the
defendant maintained an online bulletin board service (BBS), to which
people could subscribe, post material, and access materials posted by
others. 50 One user of the service proceeded to post pictures to which
Playboy held the copyright. 51  Noting that the BBS posted
"unauthorized copies of a copyrighted work," the District Court for the
Middle District of Florida found that the site had indeed directly
violated Playboy's right to public display.
52
2. Contributory Liability and Vicarious Infringement
Although the issue of ISP liability was raised in Playboy, it was
not until two years later that the contours of secondary liability of
ISPs really came into focus. In Religious Technology Center v. Netcom
On-Line Communication Services, Inc., the plaintiffs held the
copyright to the unpublished and published works of L. Ron Hubbard,
the founder of the Church of Scientology. 53 A defendant, Dennis
Erlich, posted portions of Hubbard's works online through a BBS that
was connected to the Internet through service provided by defendant
Netcom.5 4 While the District Court for the Northern District of
California did not find Netcom liable for direct infringement, it cleanly
49. Id. at 308.
50. 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1556. The court explained its reasoning as follows:
The concept of display is broad. It covers "the projection of an image on a screen
or other surface by any method, the transmission of an image by electronic or
other means, and the showing of an image on a cathode ray tube, or similar
viewing apparatus connected with any sort of information storage and retrieval
system." ... However, in order for there to be copyright infringement, the display
must be public. A "public display" is a display "at a place open to the public or...
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of family and
its social acquaintenances is [sic] gathered." A place is "open to the public" in this
sense even if access is limited to paying customers. Defendant's display of PEI's
copyrighted photographs to subscribers was a public display. Though limited to
subscribers, the audience consisted of "a substantial number of persons outside
of a normal circle of family and its social acquaintenances [sic]."
Id. at 1556-57 (citations omitted).
53. 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
54. Id. at 1365-66.
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laid out the elements of both contributory and vicarious liability. 55 In
order to prove contributory infringement, it must be shown that the
defendant (1) had knowledge of the infringing activity and (2)
substantially participated in the infringing activity.5 6 A company
substantially participates if it 'induces, causes, or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct' of the primary infringer."57 In
the case of Netcom, the plaintiffs failed to show that the ISP had
knowledge of the infringing uses before they were contacted by the
plaintiffs, thus causing their contributory infringement claim to fail. 58
The "knowledge" prong of the contributory infringement
analysis was closely evaluated in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.59 Although the Supreme Court did not expressly
delineate the branches of secondary liability, it discussed the
knowledge standard to be used when evaluating contributory
liability. 60  Because Sony did not have actual knowledge of the
infringing uses of its Betamax recording machine, the Court refused to
impose secondary liability on the company for mere "constructive
knowledge."61
The Sony Court went on to set forth its famous "staple article
of commerce" doctrine:
The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance between a copyright
holder's legitimate demand for effective-not merely symbolic-protection of the
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially
unrelated areas of commerce. Accordingly, the sale of copying equipment, like the
sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if
the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need
merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.
62
According to the Court, if there are "substantial noninfringing uses"
for an article-actual or potential-then a court should not impute
knowledge for the purpose of evaluating contributory infringement. 63
Although the plaintiff in Netcom could not establish the actual
knowledge of the ISP as required under a theory of contributory
55. See id. at 1372-77.
56. Id. at 1373.
57. Id. at 1375 (quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
58. See id. at 1375.
59. 464 U.S. 417, 435-39 (1984).
60. Id. at 439.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 442.
63. See id.
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infringement, its vicarious liability claim was much stronger.64 To
prove vicarious liability, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1)
had the right and ability to control the infringer and failed to do so,
and (2) received a "direct financial benefit" from the infringing
conduct. 65 Although Netcom contended that it could not possibly
control what its users decided to post, the company's "terms and
conditions" showed otherwise. 66  Because Netcom retained the
authority to "police" users' conduct, it raised a material question as to
whether it had the "right and ability to exercise control over the
activities of its subscribers."
6 7
However, the plaintiff could not prove that Netcom directly
benefited financially from the actions of its users.68 Returning to the
landlord-dance hall proprietor distinction set forth in Shapiro, the
Netcom court concluded that because Netcom charged a fixed fee for
its services, the ISP had no direct financial interest in the infringing
activity of its users.6 9 "There [was] no evidence that infringement by
[any] user of Netcom's services, in any way enhance[d] the value of
Netcom's services to subscribers or attract[ed] new subscribers."70 As
a result, the plaintiffs' vicarious liability claim failed as well.
7 1
C. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
Because the Netcom decision clearly and specifically delineated
the components of both contributory infringement and vicarious
liability, it serves as a paradigm of secondary liability analysis for
ISPs. Congress thought so as well. With the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA), Congress essentially codified the
holding of Netcom and attempted to bring U.S. copyright law into the
twenty-first century. 72 The Senate Report noted:
Rather than embarking upon a wholesale clarification of [contributory and
vicarious liability], the Committee decided to leave current law in its evolving state
and, instead, to create a series of "safe harbors," for certain common activities of
64. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'ns Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1375-77 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
65. Id. at 1375.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1376.
68. Id. at 1377.
69. Id. at 1376-77; see supra text accompanying notes 38-50.
70. Id. at 1377.
71. Id.
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 12B.01[A] [1] (2006).
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service providers. A service provider which qualifies for a safe harbor, receives the
benefit of limited liability.
73
The DMCA overhauled existing statutory copyright law by adding §
512-"Limitations on Liability Relating to Online Materials"-to the
Copyright Act of 1976.74 Section 512 provides "safe harbor"
exemptions from infringement liability in certain instances: (a)
transitory digital network communications; (b) system caching; (c)
information residing on systems or networks at direction of users; and
(d) information location tools.7 5 Section 512(c) addresses the problems
of secondary liability posited by earlier cases such as Netcom. 76
1. Safe Harbors
Working from prior precedent such as Sony and Netcom, §
512(c)(1) sets forth the criteria that an ISP must meet in order to
benefit from the DMCA's safe harbors.7 7 As far as knowledge is
concerned, an ISP must have no actual knowledge of the infringing
material on its site, must not be aware of any facts that may make the
infringement "apparent," and must promptly remove infringing
material in the event that such knowledge is acquired.78 According to
the legislative history of the DMCA, "apparent knowledge" requires
evidence that an ISP "turned a blind eye to 'red flags' of obvious
infringement." 79
In addition to requiring no knowledge, § 512(c)(1) insists that
the ISP receive no "financial benefit directly attributable to the
73. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19 (1998).
74. See 17 U.S.C. § 512; RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, COPYRIGHT:
UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND RELATED ToPIcs BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF WORKS OF
AUTHORSHIP 477 (9th ed. 2005).
75. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d); BROWN & DENICOLA, supra note 74, at 478.
76. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 19-20.
77. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). ("A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief,
or ... for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the
storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled
or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider-(A)(i) does not have actual
knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is
infringing; (ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or (iii) upon obtaining such
knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a
case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing
or to be the subject of infringing activity.").
78. See id.
79. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2 at 57 (1998).
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infringing activity" when the provider has the "right and ability to
control" the infringing activity.8 0 Finally, upon receiving notification
by a copyright holder of an alleged infringement, the provider must
"expeditiously" remove the material.81 This final stipulation is known
as the "notice and take-down" provision of the DMCA.
8 2
In order for an ISP to be eligible for any of the safe harbor
provisions set out in § 512, it must first meet the conditions of §
512(i).83 In order to qualify for safe harbor and a limitation of
secondary liability, an ISP much show that it:
(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account
holders of the service provider's system or network of, a policy that provides for the
termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the
service provider's system or network who are repeat infringers; and
(B) accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical measures.
8 4
Section 512(i)(1)(A) requires ISPs to (1) adopt a policy that provides
for the termination of service access for repeat copyright infringers in
appropriate circumstances, (2) implement that policy in a reasonable
manner, and (3) inform its subscribers of the policy. 5 If a service
provider fails to meet the requirements of § 512(i), it cannot qualify for
protection within the safe harbors of § 512.86
2. Back to Choppy Waters
Although the DMCA attempted to set forth a concrete structure
with which to address the future treatment of Internet infringement
claims, the subsequent treatment of such cases has been far from
uniform.8 7 While some courts plainly implemented the new provisions
of the DMCA,88 others were more skeptical of the new safe harbors
and reverted back to the standards set forth in Sony or Netcom, or a
combination of the two.8 9 In 2001, a California district court relied on
a straightforward application of § 512(c) of the DMCA to exonerate the
popular selling site eBay from secondary liability. 90  Because
80. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
81. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
82. See BROWN & DENICOLA, supra note 74, at 478.




87. See infra text accompanying notes 92-122.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 92-98.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 101-122.
90. Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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defendant eBay did not have "actual or constructive knowledge" of its
users' infringing activities and had no ability to control the activities
of its users, the court held that the site passed the safe harbor test and
granted summary judgment. 91
Another straightforward application of § 512(c) may be seen in
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, where an ISP once again found
protection under the auspices of the DMCA's safe harbor provisions.92
Co-defendants CWIE, an Internet service provider, and CCBill, an
automated service that allows its clients to use credit cards to make
payments over the Internet, were not held liable for the infringement
of their users. 93  The defendant ISP transmitted the copyrighted
images of the plaintiff without permission; however, those images
were uploaded by its clients. 94 Under the DMCA, it was the plaintiffs
responsibility to notify the ISP of the infringing material.95 While the
plaintiffs attempted to provide this notice, the notices listed only the
websites that contained the infringing images, not the web addresses
of the photos themselves. 96 As a result, the court found the plaintiffs
notification insufficient, thus not providing the defendant with the
requisite knowledge to mandate take-down under the DMCA. 97 As a
result, the ISP was granted summary judgment pursuant to § 512(c). 98
In implementing the safe harbor provision of § 512, courts
place a heavy burden on plaintiffs, requiring exacting adherence to the
notification provisions. 99  However, ISPs must meet stringent
demands of their own, and courts have been unwilling to apply DMCA
safe harbors to ISPs that fail to meet those requirements. 100 In
Ellison v. Robertson, the District Court for the Central District of
California evaluated America Online's (AOL) liability as an ISP under
the traditional notions of secondary liability.101 AOL could not be held
liable for the direct infringement of its users. 10 2 Nevertheless, because
91. Id. at 1093-94.
92. 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
93. Id. at 1084, 1102-05.
94. See id. at 1103.
95. See id. at 1098; 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
96. Perfect 10, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
97. See id. at 1104.
98. See id. at 1105.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 92-98.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 108-110.
101. 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2002), rev'd in part, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir.
2004).
102. Id. at 1056. The court explained its reasoning as follows:
AOL's role in the infringement as a passive provider of USENET access to AOL
users cannot support direct copyright infringement liability. In Netcom, the court
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AOL substantially participated in disseminating the infringing
material to millions and had reason to know of the direct
infringement, the district court found a "triable issue of fact" as to
AOL's contributory infringement. 103 However, the plaintiffs vicarious
liability claim failed because AOL received no direct financial benefit
from the infringing activity of its users. 10 4 According to the court,
"[f]inancial benefit exists where the availability of infringing material
'acts as a "draw" for customers."''1 0 5  Relying on the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., the district court
noted that "the sale or distribution of infringing materials must be a
significant draw to customers in order for vicarious liability to
apply."1
0 6
Although the district court granted AOL summary judgment as
to the vicarious liability claim, relying on the DMCA safe harbors of §
512(a),10 7 the Ninth Circuit disagreed. 0 8 According to the Ninth
Circuit, it was unclear whether AOL even passed the threshold
requirements of § 512(i) that would have allowed the company to seek
the safe harbor. 0 9 The court concluded that a jury could find that
AOL had not "reasonably implemented" a policy that addressed the
problem of repeat infringers, and therefore, summary judgment was
improper.110 The court remanded Ellison's contributory liability claim,
as the Ninth Circuit demonstrated that the safe harbor provisions of
the DMCA were not to be a cure-all for all ISPs.111
Another instance in which an ISP failed to qualify for safe
harbor was in the case of In re Aimster Copyright Litigation."2 The
defendant's Internet service implicitly allowed for the unlawful
swapping of computer music files. 113 Instead of going after individual
held that the defendant, an internet services provider like AOL, could not be
found guilty of direct copyright infringement based on copies of works that were
made and stored on its USENET servers.
Id. at 1056-57 (citation omitted).
103. Id. at 1060.
104. See id. at 1062.
105. Id. (quoting A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir.
2001)).
106. Id. at 1063 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 260 (9th
Cir. 1996)) (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 1072.
108. See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 2004).
109. Id. at 1080.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1082.
112. 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
113. See id. at 645.
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users, copyright owners sued the service provider itself.114 However,
Aimster was not only an Internet service; the system also provided
software that facilitated file-sharing amongst its users.115  In its
defense, Aimster relied on Sony, contending that, like the Betamax, its
system had "substantial noninfringing uses," and therefore, it was not
liable for contributory infringement. 116 Although the court was not
willing to adopt the defense wholesale, it noted that "when a supplier
is offering a product or service that has noninfringing as well as
infringing uses, some estimate of the respective magnitudes of these
uses is necessary for a finding of contributory infringement."
' 117
Aimster's substantial noninfringing uses defense fell apart,
however, as the court took a hard-line approach to the issue of
knowledge, at least where contributory infringement was concerned.
118
Although the Sony Court held that "constructive" knowledge was not
enough to impose contributory infringement, 119 the court in Aimster
noted an important caveat: "Willful blindness is knowledge, in
copyright law (where indeed it may be enough that the defendant
should have known of the direct infringement) .. .. *"120 The court's
unbending interpretation of the knowledge requirement carried over
into its evaluation of Aimster's DMCA claim.1 21 While the DMCA
provided safe harbor for ISPs that took "reasonable" steps to protect
against repeat infringement, Aimster failed to meet the Act's
requirements: "Far from doing anything to discourage repeat
infringers ... Aimster invited them to do so . ... 122 As a result, the
plaintiffs injunction was granted, and Aimster's service was shut
down. 123
Although ISPs attempted to take solace within the confines of
the DMCA in the post-Netcom world, courts became increasingly
skeptical of the liberal use of safe harbors. In fact, when ISPs were
brought to court for copyright infringement, straightforward
application of the DMCA was far from certain, as Ellison and Aimster
demonstrate. Not only was the law applicable to Internet
infringement claims in flux, but a new rule was on the horizon.
114. Id. at 645-46.
115. Id. at 646.
116. See id. at 649.
117. Id. at 649.
118. See id. at 650.
119. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 462 U.S. 417, 439, 488 (1984).
120. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650 (citations omitted).
121. See id. at 655-56.
122. Id. at 655.
123. See id. at 655-56.
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3. A New Theory on the Horizon: The Inducement Rule
In the era of Napster and peer-to-peer file sharing, courts kept
a watchful eye on ISPs as technology developed rapidly to allow ISPs
to circumvent prior precedent, thus perpetuating the endless
infringement of anything and everything over the World Wide Web.
By 2005, the Supreme Court had had enough, and drew a hard line in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.124 With the
death of Napster and open liability of index servers in peer-to-peer
networks, 125 ISPs sought to develop a product that offered the same
benefit-the ability to swap music from one user to another-without
the cost-copyright infringement liability. 26 Grokster was one such
company. By developing new software that bypassed the need for
central servers and allowed users to communicate directly, the
company ostensibly insulated itself from potential copyright
infringement. 127 The Supreme Court was not convinced in Grokster,
however. 128 Far from being a "passive recipient[j of information," the
Court emphasized that Grokster "knowingly and intentionally
distributed their software to enable users to reproduce and distribute.
. .copyrighted works."1 29 In fact, nearly ninety percent of the files on
the system were protected by copyright.130
Grokster relied heavily on Sony's "significant noninfringing
uses" in an attempt to defend itself against infringement liability.1 31
According to Grokster, because the service had the potential for
124. 545 U.S. 913 (2005). In the case, the Supreme Court noted a tension between
"supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection and promoting innovation in
new communication technologies by limiting the incidence of liability for copyright
infringement." Id. at 928. The Court addressed this tension, along with claims that
digital distribution of copyrighted material threatens copyright holders as never
before, because every copy is identical to the original, copying is easy, and many
people (especially the young) use file-sharing software to download copyrighted
works .... [T]he indications are that the ease of copying songs or movies using
software like Grokster's and Napster's is fostering disdain for copyright
protection.
Id. at 928-29.
125. In 2001, the Ninth Circuit found a strong likelihood that Napster was liable for
both contributory infringement and vicarious liability in A & M Records v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004, 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001). As a result, Napster was shut down and soon
after settled its copyright lawsuit. Matt Richtel, Songwriters and Publishers Reach a Deal
With Napster, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2001, at C10.
126. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 920.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 923.
129. Id. at 923, 921.
130. Id. at 922.
131. See id. at 933.
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significant noninfringing uses, knowledge of the infringing uses of its
users could not be imputed, and therefore, it could not be held liable
for contributory infringement. 132  However, the Court noted a
fundamental difference between Sony and Grokster, a difference that
the Court explained by looking to the intent of the parties.133 "[W]here
evidence . . . shows statements or actions directed to promoting
infringement, Sony's staple-article rule will not preclude liability."'134
The Court adopted the "inducement rule" and held that "one who
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement by third parties."'135
Because Grokster clearly expressed a desire to move in on the
market previously dominated by Napster and took affirmative steps
through advertising to do so, it unlawfully induced copyright
infringement by its users. 136 Consequently, the Court remanded the
case for further proceedings, designed to evaluate the "inducement"
actions of Grokster. 137  However, unlike previous decisions, the
Grokster Court did not rely on a theory of secondary liability. Instead,
the Court introduced a new breed of liability and held that Grokster
could be liable for copyright infringement under its new inducement
rule. 138
4. An Uncertain Future
In evaluating the implications of § 512, Nimmer's influential
copyright treatise notes that, "instead of drawing stark lines, Section
512 outlines a myriad of minute circumstances that can either afford
or preclude access to its safe harbors. For that reason, one must
anticipate much litigation over the concrete issues ... below before the
contours of the law develop sharp edges."'139  In hindsight, this
prediction was correct. From the printing press to the Xerox machine,
from BBS sites to new file-sharing software, copyright law has fought
to keep up with the rapid evolution of technology, while still
132. See Brief for Respondents at 1, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480).
133. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934-35.
134. Id. at 935.
135. Id. at 936-37.
136. See id. at 937-38.
137. Id. at 941.
138. Id.
139. NIMMER, supra note 72, § 12B.01[C] [4].
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attempting to maintain the delicate balance between artists' rights
and the free trade of ideas and knowledge. Although the DMCA
purported to offer a solution, it has failed. While some courts have
implemented the DMCA in evaluating service provider infringement,
others return to the standards set out in Sony or Netcom, or a
synthesis of the two.140 Most recently, the Supreme Court forewent
the above and established an entirely new test with its inducement
rule.141 A clear standard for evaluating the secondary liability of ISPs
has yet to be established.
YouTube's sweeping popularity is attributable to its popular
content, which is largely comprised of copyrighted material.1 42 The
site's sweeping popularity has opened the door for potential copyright
infringement claims and has thrown the issue of the secondary
liability of service providers back to the forefront of legal minds.
Although the DMCA attempted to provide a workable framework for
addressing such infringement claims in the ever-expanding virtual
environment, it has failed. It is time to go back to the drawing board.
II. YoUTUBE'S LIABILITY UNDER CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW
Is YouTube liable for copyright infringement? The site
maintains that it is free from legal liability, arguing that its actions
fall under fair use as well as within the "safe harbors" of the DMCA.1 43
According to Fred von Lohman, attorney for the Electronic Frontier
Foundation in San Francisco, "YouTube looks to be on relatively firm
legal ground."'144 However, John Palfrey, an intellectual property
professor at Harvard Law School, disagrees.1 45 In Palfrey's opinion,
the financial benefit that Google derives from advertising sales
precludes the site from taking advantage of the DMCA's safe
harbors. 146 Who is right?
140. See supra text accompanying notes 92-98, 101-122.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 126-138.
142. Many critics note that the majority of the most viewed clips on the site "involve
some type of copyright infringement." Delaney, supra note 2, at Al.
143. See Tim Weber, Google's Copyright Nightmare, BBC NEWS, Oct. 10, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6038116.stm.
144. Matthew Karnitschnig & Kevin J. Delaney, Media Titans Pressure YouTube
Over Copyrights, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2006, at A3.
145. Id.
146. See id.
FROM SAFE HARBOR TO CHOPPY WATERS
A. YouTube Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
YouTube shrouds itself within the safe harbors of the DMCA in
an attempt to insulate itself from liability for copyright
infringement. 147 However, how safe are those safe harbors for this
new Internet sensation? For an ISP to claim safe harbor under the
DMCA, it must meet the stipulations in § 512(c)(1). 148 Pursuant to
this section, an ISP must prove that it had no knowledge of the
infringing material. 149 It must have no "actual knowledge" of the
infringing material and no knowledge of circumstances that would
make infringing activity "apparent. 1 50 If the website is notified that
such infringing material is located on the site, then it must have acted
"expeditiously" to have the offending material removed.151
In YouTube's case, the site contests that it would be
"impossible to screen each of the 65,000 clips added each day."
1 52
Moreover, YouTube was developed to, and continues to, serve
legitimate, substantial noninfringing uses-the sharing of user-
generated content amongst friends and social networks. 153 As a result,
given the absence of "actual knowledge" of particular cases of
infringement, a court most likely would not impute knowledge to
YouTube under § 512(c)(1)(A) in evaluating its potential liability for
infringement, and therefore, would not hold the site liable for
infringement.
A second piece of the knowledge analysis requires that the ISP
not be aware of "circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent."154  The legislative history of the DMCA states that,
although an ISP is not obligated to "seek out copyright infringement..
. it would not qualify for safe harbor if it turned a blind eye to 'red
flags' of obvious infringement." 155 However, in order for such a red
flag to be raised, the infringing material must be "obviously
pirate[d]." 156  Because YouTube does not initially screen users'
uploads, instead only monitoring them once put on notice, the site
147. See Delaney, supra note 2, at Al.
148. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2000).
149. Id.
150. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A).
151. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
152. Jonathan Thaw, Google's $200 Million Legal Reserve Underscores YouTube
Worries, BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 15, 2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&sid =at8yc9NCGjOw.
153. See Delaney, supra note 2, at Al.
154. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A).
155. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 48 (1998).
156. Id. at 49.
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does not willfully ignore red flags of piracy and meets the knowledge
prong of the safe harbor analysis.
157
In fact, YouTube professes that it "goes out of its way" to
protect the content of copyright holders, in compliance with the third
prong of the safe harbor analysis. 158 Upon receiving notification by a
copyright holder of an alleged infringement, the DMCA requires that a
provider "expeditiously" remove the material. 159 YouTube complies
with this "notice and take-down" provision by establishing channels
through which copyright holders can notify the site of unlawful
infringement, in order to have the clip removed. 160 The site's Terms of
Use state:
[I]f you are a copyright owner or an agent thereof and believe that any User
Submission or other content infringes upon your copyrights, you may submit a
notification pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") by
providing our Copyright Agent with the following information in writing (see 17
U.S.C 512(c)(3) for further detail).
1 6 1
Additionally, YouTube has attempted to formulate a system to protect
against such infringement as effectively as possible and has
implemented a ten-minute-length limit upon discovering that "longer
videos were more likely to be copyrighted."'162 In compliance with §
512(i) of the DMCA, the site has also adopted a policy that provides for
the termination of service access for repeat copyright infringers in
appropriate circumstances, has implemented that policy in a
reasonable manner, and has informed its subscribers of the policy. 63
Therefore, YouTube satisfies both the first and third prongs of the safe
harbor analysis.
The second prong of the safe harbor analysis-requiring that
an ISP not receive a direct financial benefit-could be the most
problematic for YouTube.1 64  Even if YouTube meets both the
knowledge and take-down requirements, the site "entered uncharted
157. See McKenna, supra note 14, at B1.
158. Greg Sandoval, YouTube Dances the Copyright Tango, CNET NEWS.COM, July
24, 2006, http://www.news.com/2100-1025_3-6097365.html.
159. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).
160. See YouTube Terms of Use, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Sept.
22, 2007).
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Your 15 Minutes of Fame..ummm. .. Make that 10 Minutes or Less,
http://www.youtube.com/blog?entry=oorjVvHDVs (Mar. 26, 2006) [hereinafter Your 15
Minutes of Fame].
163. See YouTube Terms of Use, supra note 160.
164. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2000).
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territory when it recently began adding ads next to search results." 165
The site's advertising-based business model could prove to be a legal
liability to the company.166 According to Gary Stein of Ammo
Marketing in San Francisco, sites like YouTube are "attractive to
advertisers for one reason: numbers."'167 YouTube's success in ad sales
depends on how many users visit the site; the more users the site
attracts, the more the company can charge for advertising. 168
However, many critics note that the majority of the most viewed clips
on the site "involve some type of copyright infringement."'1 69 Arguably,
because the infringing clips attract users and those users allow
YouTube to profit from advertising sales, YouTube benefits from the
infringing material posted on its site. Because YouTube receives a
direct financial benefit from advertising sales that are stimulated by
infringing material, it very likely may be precluded from seeking
shelter under the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA.
B. YouTube's Liability Under the Copyright Act of 1976
Even if a court determines that YouTube benefits financially
from the infringing material on its site, thus precluding it from taking
advantage of the DMCA's safe harbors, that is not the end of the
inquiry regarding the legal liability of the site. In the event that an
ISP's activities fall outside the limitations on liability specified in the
DMCA, liability is adjudicated based on the doctrines of direct,
vicarious, or contributory liability for infringement as they are
articulated in the Copyright Act and in judicial opinions interpreting
and applying that statute. These theories of liability are unchanged
by § 512 and the DMCA. 170
Even though YouTube is "pushing at the boundaries" of
copyright law and the DMCA,' 71 in order to evaluate its potential
liability, one has to look back to the beginning, back to its liability
under the Copyright Act of 1976.
165. Heather Green, Whose Video is It, Anyway? YouTube's Runaway Success Has
Opened a Pandora's Box of Copyright Issues, BUS. WK., Aug. 7, 2006, at 38.
166. See generally Greg Sandoval, YouTube: Too Rough for Advertisers?, CNET
NEWS.COM, Apr. 21, 2006, http://www.news.com/2100-1024_3-6063536.html (describing
YouTube's advertising-based business model).
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. Delaney, supra note 2, at Al.
170. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 55 (1998).
171. Weber, supra note 143.
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1. Direct Infringement
For YouTube to be directly liable for copyright infringement, it
must have encroached upon one of the exclusive rights of the copyright
holder as listed in § 106 of the Copyright Act. 172 However, because
YouTube does not post the infringing material itself, it cannot be held
directly liable. 173 On the other hand, as the site's users unlawfully
post copyrighted material, YouTube may be potentially liable for
secondary infringement, similar to the BBS in Netcom. 174 In order for
a copyright holder to succeed in a suit for secondary infringement
against the site, he must prove the elements of contributory
infringement or vicarious liability.
75
2. Contributory Infringement
A case for contributory infringement is made out if the
defendant (1) had knowledge of the infringing activity and (2)
substantially participated in that infringing activity.1 76 YouTube
allows users around the world to view anything and everything posted
by other users, including copyrighted material. Therefore, it is
reasonable to believe that a court would find that YouTube
substantially participates in the spread of the infringing material.
The knowledge prong of the contributory infringement analysis
would be more difficult to prove. Because YouTube has the
"substantial noninfringing use" of sharing personal video clips with
others, courts would likely be wary in inferring knowledge for the
purposes of evaluating contributory infringement.1 77 Therefore, a
contributory infringement claim against YouTube is likely to fail.
3. Vicarious Liability
A vicarious liability claim may be more promising for a
copyright holder to pursue against YouTube. Vicarious liability
172. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
173. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1372-73 (N.D. Cal. 1995). Like the BBS in Netcom, YouTube is insulated from
direct liability. Id.
174. Id. at 1373-75.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 55-71 (detailing the requirements for
proving secondary liability of an Internet service provider).
176. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373.
177. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
442-56 (1984) (finding no contributory infringement because the Betamax was capable of
substantial noninfringing uses).
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requires that the owner of a copyright prove that the defendant had
(1) the right and the ability to control the infringing activity and failed
to do so and (2) received a "direct financial benefit" from the infringing
conduct. 178 Although a spokeswoman for YouTube declared that it
would be "impossible to screen each of the 65,000 clips added each
day," 179 that does not necessarily mean that the site does not have the
right and ability to control its users. YouTube, like Netcom, boasts
extensive Terms of Use that are clearly incorporated into the site.180
The terms state the following: "YouTube will ... terminate a User's
access to its Website, if . . . they are determined to be a repeat
infringer."18 1 Although the conditions seemingly insulate the site from
infringement liability on their face, they also demonstrate the site's
purported right and ability to control the activities of its users.18 2 In
Netcom, the district court interpreted a similar policy as
demonstrating the site's right to "police" its users' conduct and
activities.183  Therefore, it is possible that a court would view
YouTube's Terms of Use as fulfilling a similar function, thus proving
the first prong of the vicarious liability analysis.
As for the financial analysis under the theory of vicarious
liability, the site's advertising-based business model once again could
prove legally problematic for the company. YouTube attracts
advertisers because of its vast viewership.18 4 Attracting more viewers
has a direct relationship to the site's advertising revenues: the more
viewers, the more ad sales, and the more the site can charge for such
advertising.18 5 Moreover, many critics contend that the most popular
content of the site, the content that attracts the most users, is in fact
copyrighted and uploaded illegally.186 Therefore, because the
infringing clips attract users, and those users allow YouTube to profit
from advertising sales,187 YouTube benefits from the infringing
material posted on its site.
178. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
179. Thaw, supra note 152.
180. See YouTube Terms of Use, supra note 160.
181. Id.
182. In Netcom, the defendant BBS contended that it could not be held liable for
vicarious infringement, because it allegedly did not have the power to control the activities
of its users. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375. However, the court found that the terms and
condition of the site that allowed Netcom to "reserveo the right to take remedial action
against subscribers," demonstrated its ability and control over its subscribers. Id.
183. Id. at 1376.
184. See Sandoval, YouTube: Too Rough for Advertisers?, supra note 166.
185. See id.
186. See Delaney, supra note 2, at Ai.
187. See Sandoval, YouTube: Too Rough for Advertisers?, supra note 166.
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Unlike the infringing material in Netcom, infringing clips on
YouTube "enhancea the value of ... services to subscribers [and]
attract[] new customers."18 8  Looking to the foundation case of
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co v. H. L. Green Co., YouTube is more
analogous to a music hall proprietor who benefits from the unlawful
activities of his performers than a landlord who has no knowledge or
control over his tenants.18 9 Because YouTube has the right and ability
to control its users, and benefits financially from their infringing
conduct, the site could be held liable under a theory of vicarious
copyright infringement.
4. Grokster's Inducement Rule for Liability
Another avenue for establishing the liability of YouTube may
be through the Supreme Court's Grokster decision. 190 In fact, Robert
Tur, owner of the Los Angeles News Service, is relying on the
infamous decision in his suit against YouTube, filed on July 14,
2006.191 Tur claims that "[b]ecause YouTube has the [infringing] files
on its servers, it is able to have 'actual knowledge of what particular
copyrightable files are being distributed, played and copied through its
service."' 192 According to Tur, because the site "generates advertising
dollars in accordance with the number of visitors to its Web site ...
the site encourages infringing behavior."'193 However, the Court based
its holding in Grokster on its new inducement rule, which required a
"clear expression" that the ISP had taken "affirmative steps" to foster
infringement. 194  Unlike Grokster, a service that was explicitly
designed to usurp the unlawful Napster market,1 95 YouTube is more
comparable to the Betamax of Sony in that it has legitimate,
"substantial noninfringing uses,"196 such as sharing personal and/or
non-copyrighted videos with family and friends. Therefore, a theory of
liability against YouTube under the Grokster inducement rule is likely
to fail.
188. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1377.
189. See 316 F.2d 304, 307-08 (2d Cir. 1963); text accompanying notes 38-48.
190. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); see
supra text accompanying notes 124-138 (detailing the contours of the inducement rule as
set forth by the Grokster Court).
191. See Journalist Sues YouTube for Display of Reginald Denny Video, MEALEY'S
LITIG. REP. COPYRIGHT, Aug. 7, 2006, at 17.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937.
195. See id. at 937-38.
196. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
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C. What About Fair Use?
If a copyright holder proceeded with a claim for vicarious
liability against YouTube, the site would most likely not have a viable
fair use defense. The factors of a fair use defense, as set forth in § 107
of the Copyright Act, include: (1) the purpose and character of the use;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work;
and (4) the potential market harm of the copying of the copyrighted
work. 19
7
1. Purpose and Character of the Use
Whereas commercial use of a copyrighted work was once
presumptively not fair use, courts have since retreated from such an
extreme position.198 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has clearly
stated that commercial use of a copyrighted work "tends to weigh
against a finding of fair use."'199 Although the posting of copyrighted
clips on YouTube might be for personal enjoyment, the use is of a
commercial character nonetheless given the site's advertising-based
model. This works against YouTube in a fair use analysis. 200
Moreover, in determining the purpose and character of the use, courts
look to "whether the new work merely 'supersede[s] the objects' of the
original creation or instead adds something new, with a further
purpose or different character . . .; it asks, in other words, whether
and to what extent the new work is 'transformative."' 201 Copyrighted
clips are posted on YouTube to perform their original function: to
entertain. Nothing new is added to the clips that would change their
inherent character. Therefore, the first factor of the fair use
analysis-the purpose and character of the use-falls in favor of
copyright holders.
197. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
198. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994) (quoting Sony,
464 U.S. at 448-49) ("[T]he commercial .. .character of a work is 'not conclusive,' but
rather a fact to be 'weighed along with other[s] in fair use decisions."').
199. Id. (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 562).
200. The commercial nature of YouTube's clips is demonstrated through the site's
advertising-based business model. See Sandoval, YouThbe: Too Rough for Advertisers?,
supra note 166. Essentially, the infringing clips on YouTube "enhanced the value of...
services to subscribers [and] attract[] new subscribers" to the site. Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F.Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also
supra text accompanying notes 167-176 (discussing YouTube's advertising-based business
model).
201. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citations omitted).
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2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second factor in the fair use analysis considers the nature
of the copyrighted work.20 2 By looking at the nature of the work, the
fair use analysis recognizes that "some works are closer to the core of
intended copyright protection than others," and that creative works
fall into the "core of the copyright's protective purposes."20 3 Therefore,
there is a legal presumption against fair use in the copying of creative
works. 204 Although YouTube was created to allow for the efficient
swapping of user-generated content, the site has far surpassed its
humble roots. 20 5 The site now hosts innumerable clips from television
shows, music videos, and movies. 20 6 Because such works are creative
in nature, they lie at the heart of copyright and are entitled to the core
of copyright protection.2 7 As a result, the second factor of the fair use
analysis falls against YouTube as well.
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
The third factor in analyzing a fair use claim looks to the
"amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole." 20 8  In the spring of 2005, YouTube
implemented a ten-minute-length limit on clips in order to help
"balance the rights of copyright owners with the rights of users."
20 9
The site "poked around" and determined that longer videos were more
likely to be copyright protected. 210  Although such a move
demonstrated a good faith effort on the part of the site to prevent the
dissemination of copyright works, that effort does not necessarily push
the third factor in favor of YouTube.
The third factor is a "qualitative" assessment of the taking, not
necessarily a quantitative one.21' Therefore, although a three-minute
clip taken from an hour-long program may not amount to a significant
portion of the show as a whole, it may still constitute a "substantial"
portion of the work if it copies the "heart" of the copyrighted work.
202. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
203. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
204. See id. (noting that fair use is more difficult to establish when such creative
works are copied).
205. See Delaney, supra note 2, at Al.
206. Id.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 203-204.
208. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2000).
209. Your 15 Minutes of Fame, supra note 162.
210. Id.
211. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985).
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The heart of a copyrighted work is that which is unique to the work,
thus giving the copyright its value. 212 Therefore, stealing the heart of
the work, however long or short, may prove as detrimental as stealing
the work in its entirety. 213 As Judge Learned Hand remarked, "no
plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he
did not pirate."
21 4
The value of the clips on YouTube is that they provide
entertainment to millions of the site's users on a daily basis.21 5
Essentially, the site has opened up an entire new genre of
entertainment for the twenty-first century. 216 However, the fact that
the entirety of copyrighted works is not available to be downloaded
does limit the site's exploitation of copyrighted clips. 21 7 For example,
YouTube initially gained widespread popularity with the posting of
"Lazy Sunday," a faux music video from NBC's Saturday Night Live.218
The skit was viewed six million times on YouTube before it was finally
pulled following a request from NBC. 219 The fact that the entire
episode of Saturday Night Live was not posted did not affect the
popularity of the clip. Instead, the two-and-one-half-minute clip was
representative of what the audience wanted to view and was the heart
for the work from which it was taken. As far as the fair use analysis
is concerned, this factor once again weighs against YouTube.
4. Potential Market Harm
The final step in analyzing a fair use claim is evaluating the
"effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work."220 A plaintiff only must show that an infringing
use harms a "potential" market.221 However, because the Internet is
quickly becoming the ultimate entertainment destination, the market
harm caused by infringement of sites such as YouTube is far more
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936).
215. See Delaney, supra note 2, at Al.
216. See id. (discussing YouTube's increasing popularity and its competitors'
attempts to keep up).
217. Clips themselves are valuable for the traffic they bring to the site. According to
Gary Stein of Ammo Marketing in San Francisco, sites like YouTube are "attractive to
advertisers for one reason: numbers." Sandoval, YouTube: Too Rough for Advertisers?,
supra note 166.
218. See Delaney, supra note 2, at Al.
219. Id.
220. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).
221. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
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than speculative. For example, the "Lazy Sunday" skit was viewed six
million times on YouTube before it was removed. 222 The skit was also
available for download from Apple's iTunes store for $1.99.223
Although not all six million viewers would have paid the iTunes fee in
order to purchase the clip, at least some of them would have. Thus,
NBC and Apple were deprived of these potential profits.
However, media giants are not the only ones who are having
the value of their copyrights streamed away. Take, for example,
independent video producers Fritz Grobe and Stephen Voltz. 224 The
pair conceived an elaborate display of the physics of carbonation by
dropping five hundred Mentos candies into one hundred two-liter
bottles of Diet Coke. 225 Grobe and Voltz filmed the experiment and
posted the video on Revver.com, a site that shares advertising revenue
with individuals who post popular videos. 226 Grobe and Voltz hoped to
make a small profit for their eight months of work.
227
It was not long, however, before the Mentos video showed up on
YouTube and was seen close to eight million times. 228 On Revver.com,
the clip was viewed only 5.5 million times, earning Grobe and Voltz
$30,000.229 The pair believes that they lost half of their advertising
income because of hits lost to unauthorized YouTube copies.
230
YouTube not only usurps the market of media giants but also that of
the independent filmmaker, the "little guy." Given the potential and
oftentimes actual harm, this final factor weighs against YouTube as
well.
Unfortunately for YouTube, it fails at every turn of the fair use
analysis. Its use is commercial in nature, in order to attract more
users and increase advertising sales. Such a commercial use, even if
not presumptively unfair, definitely weighs against a finding of fair
use.231 Moreover, the copyrighted clips are largely creative, thus lying
at the core of copyright protection.232 Because the clips may be said to
represent the heart of a given work and detrimentally affect the
222. See Delaney, supra note 2, at Al.
223. Anne Broache, SNL Cult Hit Yanked From Video-Sharing Site, CNET
NEWS.COM, Feb. 17, 2006, http://www.news.com/2100-1026_3-6041031.html.
224. See Green, supra note 165, at 38.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Talk of the Nation: On YouTube, Popularity Can Be a Curse (National Public
Radio broadcast Nov. 14, 2006) [hereinafter Talk of the Nation].
228. Id.
229. Green, supra note 165, at 38.
230. See Talk of the Nation, supra note 227.
231. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).
232. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
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market for the copyrighted work, a fair use claim by YouTube must
fail, and the site is potentially liable for copyright infringement.
III. LEGALLY LIABLE, YET PROTECTED ALL THE SAME
Even though a court could hold YouTube liable for copyright
infringement, the site has gone to great lengths and expense to
prevent that from happening. 233 Following YouTube's acquisition by
the Internet behemoth Google, the site became a virtual bull's eye for
copyright litigation. 234 Because the site was no longer a modest shop
of thirty-five employees, copyright holders were incentivized to bring
infringement suits, a possible victory being well worth their while. 235
However, Google has put its deep coffers and army of lawyers to good
use.236 In an attempt to quell the raging storm of copyright liability,
YouTube removed over 30,000 clips of television shows, movies, and
music videos in early October 2006, following a claim filed by the
Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers and Publishers.237
The site also has begun entering licensing agreements with
entertainment powerhouses, including Universal Music Group, Sony
BMG, and Warner Music Group, to avoid potential infringement
claims.238  The studios will receive a percentage of the advertising
proceeds that derive from their copyrighted content, 239 while they, in
turn, turn a blind eye to the infringing content. 240 While YouTube is
hoping to avoid potential infringement suits brought by the studios,
the studios, recognizing the universal appeal of the site, are adopting
an "if you can't beat 'em, join 'em" mentality. 241 Regarding the
233. See generally Katie Hafner, We're Google. So Sue Us., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2006,
at C1 (discussing Google's "aggressive" response to potential legal problems).
234. With Google's acquisition of YouTube in October 2006, commentators predicted,
"Google will inherit law claims over YouTube." Li & Adegoke, supra note 13, at B23. The
site became referred to as Google's "litigation-laden landmine." Wu, supra note 18. Because
YouTube was no longer a fly-by-night operation, copyright holders had more incentive to
bring potential infringement suits: a possible victory opening up the deep, deep pockets of
Google and well worth the while. See Karnitschnig & Delaney, supra note 144, at A3.
235. See Karnitschnig & Delaney, supra note 144, at A3.
236. See Hafner, supra note 233, at C1.
237. Cohen, supra note 16, at C8.
238. Li & Adegoke, supra note 13, at B23.
239. Peter Kafka, Can YouTube Grow Up and Stay Cool?, FORBES.COM, Sept. 18,
2006, http://www.forbes.com/digitalentertainment/2006/09/18/youtube-warner-video-tech-
mediacx-pk_0918youtube.html.
240. See Karnitschnig & Delaney, supra note 144, at A3 (noting that media
companies have generally tolerated YouTube's use of their videos).
241. See Anne Becker et al., Big Changes Ahead: How Google-YouTube Will Shake
Up the TV Industry, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 16, 2006, at 14 (arguing networks will
need to decide whether to take a "beat 'em" or "join'em" attitude toward Google-YouTube).
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licensing deals, Chad Hurley, chief executive of YouTube, stated that
'YouTube is committed to balancing the needs of the fan community
with those of copyright holders."
242
However, what about the Mentos video makers of the world?
What about the little guy? How can he protect his content when he
does not have the deep pockets of Google at his expense? David A.
Milman, the chief executive of Rescuecom (an Internet provider of
computer services), has experience trying to take on Google after suing
the service for trademark infringement.243 In an interview with The
New York Times, he candidly commented, "People say you can't fight
the government. Google, in this case, is very similar to the
government. They're the government of the internet.' '244 Because the
"little guy" is just that-little--it is easy to dismiss his plight: What is
the damage of copying just one video? However, from the beginning,
the Supreme Court has recognized such reasoning as being
precarious. 245 In Sony, the Court noted that, "[a]lthough such a use
may seem harmless when viewed in isolation, '[isolated] instances of
minor infringements, when multiplied many times, become in the
aggregate a major inroad on copyright that must be prevented.'
246
IV. AN AMORPHOUS PROBLEM IN NEED OF A CONCRETE ANSWER
A. What is the Problem?
One major problem with copyright law as it applies to YouTube
is that both copyright holders and developers of new technologies have
to rely on legislation that was passed before the technology existed.
Unfortunately, "technology is often several steps ahead of copyright
law."247  In passing the DMCA, Congress took its best stab at a
dilemma that had no boundaries: how to regulate the burgeoning
world of technology. 248 In the spirit of copyright law, the DMCA tried
to balance the competing interests of promoting artistic creativity with
242. Press Release, YouTube, Universal Music Group and YouTube Forge Strategic
Partnership (Oct. 9, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/pressroom-entry?entry=JrYdNx45e-0.
243. See Hafner, supra note 233, at Cl.
244. Id.
245. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 482
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
246. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
247. Talk of the Nation, supra note 227.
248. The Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the purpose of the DMCA was "to
facilitate the robust development and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce,
communications, research, development, and education in the digital age." S. REP. NO. 105-
190, at 1-2 (1998).
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the desire to expand and advance knowledge. 249 However, as shown
through the problems with YouTube, the DMCA falls short on the side
of promotion and protection and allows for the expanded exploitation
of the rights of copyright holders, both large and small. 250 Although
the notice and take-down provisions of the Act seemingly protect the
rights of copyright holders, in reality, the DMCA provides little solace
to those whose work is being pirated. 251 Even if infringing copies are
initially removed, it seems inevitable that they will be reposted within
days, or even hours. 252 Essentially, in reaping the benefits of their
work, copyright holders deserve "more bites of the apple. 253
However, the current dilemma of how to regulate the
burgeoning world of technology is dangerous. If a litany of copyright
holders begin to take YouTube to court, "[i]t might take 10 years of
litigation to get a clear sense" of where the law will lie, intellectual
property professor Lawrence Lessig predicts. 254 According to Lessig,
this is problematic: "In Internet time, it's an eternity. There's 10
years of chilled innovation. That's really quite costly. 255
B. What is the Answer?
Attempting to sue YouTube out of existence is not the answer.
It is "inevitable" that "another site, another technology, will rise up on
its place and the same thing will happen over and over again. 256
Moreover, such a litigious route could very well result in the chilling of
innovation as predicted by Lessig, a result directly contrary to the
spirit of the Copyright Act. This does not mean, however, that the
courts should play no role at all.
A more promising approach would be to force YouTube to put
its promises into action. For example, as a part of its licensing
arrangements, the site promised to implement a "content
249. See id. at 69.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 222-230.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 224-230 (outlining the case of Fritz Grobe
and Stephen Voltz, creators of the Mentos video).
252. See, e.g., Green, supra note 165, at 38 (noting that once removed, copies of
Grobe and Voltz's video kept reappearing, forcing them to notify YouTube to take down
each individual version).
253. Rickard Siklos & Bill Carter, Old Model Versus a Speedster, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
18, 2006, at C1.
254. Heather Green & Lorraine Woellert, Coming to Grips with Grokster: Now the
Only Thing Innovators are Sure of is That They'll Have to Watch Their Step, BUS. WK., July
11, 2005, at 37 (quoting Lawrence Lessig).
255. Id. (quoting Lawrence Lessig).
256. Talk of the Nation, supra note 227.
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identification system," creating a virtual "first line of defence [sic]"
against the uploading of infringing copies. 257 YouTube expected to
have completed the software by September 2006; however, by the end
of the year there was no such system in sight.258 In fact, the tenuous
peace that YouTube has fashioned through content agreements may
be at risk if the site fails to implement such a safeguard: "[flailure to
build adequate systems to protect copyright owners could . . . add to
the risk of legal action against the site."
259
The judicial system needs to tackle YouTube head-on and find
the site liable for copyright infringement in order to incentivize the
site to step up its efforts in developing and implementing a content
identification system. Suing YouTube out of existence is not the
answer. Bankrupting the site through litigation will not solve the
problem. Instead, courts should condition the site's liability on the
implementation of an adequate content identification system. For
example, every week the site is operated without screening
copyrighted content, YouTube should have to pay a fine. Then, that
fine should be distributed to copyright holders whose rights are
infringed by the site.
Who will be reimbursed under such a system? In order to get a
piece of the "fine pie," copyright holders should be required to contact
the site and provide proof of infringing material. Such a requirement
would not be overly burdensome, as copyright owners are already
accustomed to providing such information under the DMCA's notice
and take-down provisions. Once the site is contacted, the owner's
name can be put on a list of those who will receive compensation for
YouTube's failure to implement copyright protections. Once a fixed
fee-per-play is established, by YouTube or the court, that amount can
then be multiplied by how many times each video is viewed, thus
generating the amount an individual holder is to be paid for
YouTube's profiting off of the copyrighted content. Because YouTube
keeps a running tally of how many times each video is seen, awarding
the copyright holder a portion of the fine in relation to how many
times his or her video is seen is a matter of simple algebra. 260
In order to prevent the abuse of such a system, YouTube can
demand that owners prove their ownership in such a work. Such
257. Richard Waters, YouTube Lag on Software Might Hit Google Plans, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 30, 2006, at 11.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. For example, if the fee-per-play owed by YouTube is $1.00 and a copyright
holder's property is played 150 in one week, YouTube would owe the copyright holder
$150.00- $1.00 x 150 plays = $150.00.
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verification steps could follow those laid out by the DMCA in §
512(c)(3)(A), which requires that the copyright owner provide a
written communication including the following information:
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the
owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
(ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if
multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single
notification, a representative list of such works at that site.
(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the
subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be
disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to
locate the material.
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the
complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an
electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted.
(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the
material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its
agent, or the law. [and]
(vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under
penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the
owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
2 6 1
Essentially, YouTube would be able incorporate the statutory
verification and notification procedures set forth above in the
implementation of their own copyright protection system.
Although taking this action appears very similar to simply
complying with the notice and take-down provisions of the DMCA, the
difference here is that a copyright holder would only be required to act
once. Once YouTube is put on notice of the infringing material and
the owner of that material, it should be YouTube's responsibility to
keep a list of complaining copyright holders as well as their
copyrighted works. When it comes time to distribute the fine to
individual copyright owners, YouTube would be required to review its
list of how many times each video is viewed and would then pay out
funds accordingly.
While this system would put far more responsibility into the
hands of YouTube, doing so is only fair. After all, "[f]airness is what
justice really is."262 The site is making money off of the clips of
261. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) (2000).
262. BrainyQuote.com, Potter Stewart Quotes, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/
authors/p/potter-stewart.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
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copyright owners. 26 3 Therefore, it is inequitable that copyright holders
should bear the cost of protecting their rights against those who
violate them. The copyright owner should not be saddled with the
obligation to inform YouTube every time a pirated version of their
work appears on the site. Instead, YouTube is far better equipped to
implement protections that can alert it of such instances. The
responsibility should lie in the hands of those best-equipped to
implement the protections required. In this case, that is undoubtedly
YouTube.
Requiring YouTube to maintain a database of copyright holders
and their individual rights also lays an integral foundation for a
future content identification system. Once in place, such a system
would "automatically identif[y] content and match it to a master
list."264 In making its deals with entertainment studios such as
Universal Music Group, Sony BMG, and Warner Music Group,
YouTube has begun developing a "master list" of the companies'
holdings in order to distribute advertising revenue. 265 Once individual
copyright holders have met the specifications outlined above, they too
should be put on the list, forcing YouTube to protect their interests
just as the site does for the larger studio houses. The little guy should
then receive the same benefit afforded to the media giants:
distribution of advertising revenues. As YouTube already distributes
advertising revenue to the media giants, the little guy should be
afforded the same benefit.
Whereas contracts set the terms and conditions for payouts
from YouTube to different powerhouse studios, it is undeniable that
the independent videographer lacks the resources to negotiate with
the YouTube juggernaut. However, instead of negotiating separate
contracts with every individual videographer, a task without end,
YouTube could implement the distribution system used in dividing the
hypothetical fine outlined above in distributing advertising revenues
amongst independent copyright holders. Once a fixed fee-per-play is
established, that amount can then be multiplied by how many times
each video is viewed, thus generating the amount an individual holder
is to be paid for YouTube's profiting off of the copyrighted content.
Another important feature of a successful content identification
system would be the capability for copyright holders to remove their
263. See, e.g., Sandoval, YouTube Dances the Copyright Tango, supra note 158
(discussing how the increasing number of videos and users makes YouTube's plan to sell
advertisements an attractive and profitable option).
264. Kafka, supra note 239.
265. See id.; Li & Adegoke, supra note 13, at B23 (discussing YouTube's deals with
Universal Music Group and Sony BMG).
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own material without having to contact YouTube time and time
again.266 Such a feature would allow the copyright holder to take
proactive steps to protect his interests, beyond merely sending a letter
or filing a lawsuit. 267 Although the implementation of a sophisticated
content identification system would be labor intensive and costly at
the front end, that does not mean that it cannot be done. Other
popular social networking sites, such as MySpace, have successfully




It is hard to believe that the "Invention of the Year" for 2006,269
a website that streams more than seventy million videos on a daily
basis,270 does not have the capacity to protect the rights of copyright
holders while maintaining the service to the public that has become so
universally popular. Shutting down YouTube is not the answer. Not
only will a multitude of competitor sites be waiting in the wings to
take its place, 271 but such a move would deprive the public of the
benefits that the site offers. In a recent interview with the Christian
Science Monitor, a new YouTube user announced: "It's entertaining,
it's information, it's a community of people sharing things."272 As the
site itself professes, YouTube allows individuals to "upload, tag and
share videos worldwide, [b]rowse millions of original videos uploaded
by community members, [f]ind, join and create video groups to connect
with people who have similar interests, [and c]ustomize the experience
by subscribing to member videos, saving favorites, and creating
playlists."273
In an attempt to address the legal quandary that YouTube has
introduced into the world of copyright law, the law should not throw
the baby out with the bathwater. Granted, as more technology is
developed at lightning speed, the ability of the law to effectively
regulate such will become increasingly murky. By implementing
266. See Kevin J. Delaney & Ethan Smith, YouTube Model is Compromise Over
Copyrights, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006, at B1.
267. See id.
268. See Kafka, supra note 239.
269. Grossman, supra note 3, at 62.
270. About YouTube, supra note 7.
271. See Greg Sandoval, YouTube Rivals Look for Answers, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan.
10, 2007, http://www.news.com/2100-1025_3-6149004.html.
272. Daniel B. Wood, The YouTube World Opens an Untamed Frontier for Copyright
Law, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 18, 2006, at 1.
273. About YouTube, supra note 7.
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systems that are capable of addressing fact-specific problems, sites
such as YouTube are taking the initiative to help clear the water.
Instead of waiting for the law to catch up with technology, a race that
may never be won, it is important to develop regulatory alternatives
that can be as fluid and forward-looking as the technology that they
are meant to regulate.
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